Epistemic Framing: How the Presentation of Risk Alters Executive Judgment

support@gc-bs.org (Global Council for Behavioral Science) — Mon, 10 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000

Introduction
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For much of the twentieth century, classical economic theory and management science conceptualized the executive decision-maker as Homo economicus, a perfectly rational calculator capable of processing infinite variables to maximize expected utility. Rooted in the expected utility theory formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, this paradigm relies heavily on the principles of formal logic and the strict axiom of extensionality, or description invariance. This foundational assumption mandates a rigid logical consistency: if two decision problems are mathematically equivalent, a rational actor’s choice must remain identical regardless of how the options are semantically presented. However, empirical evidence spanning behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, and neurobiology resoundingly refutes this premise.

Epistemic Framing on Global Council for Behavioral Science

Epistemic Framing: How the Presentation of Risk Alters Executive Judgment

Introduction #

Introduction
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